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Metacognition
of Memory

Truth Telling in Creative Nonfiction
Courtney Nichole Bulsiewicz

Much of creative nonfiction is born out of the past, and
most creative nonfiction writers understand the complicated nature of
memory in which the histories of our individual and collective experiences
exist. Theorist Paul Ricoeur discusses many of these memory complexities,
delineating how elusive memory can be and showing how even in the moment
we are experiencing an event, we are engaged in forgetting pieces of it (30).
Likewise, as we move on from the event and try to recollect and engage in
anamnesis (Aristotle’s term to denote an active search of our memories) our
current understanding and experience alters the remembered event (Ricoeur
17–18). This intricate process of memory is a core issue in the debate surrounding
creative nonfiction and truth, for if our memory is imperfect, and we are
writing a piece representing an experience contained in the past, how can that
representation be true, particularly when the idea of truth further confounds
the matter through its ambiguity?
Ricoeur raises this question of truth in historical representations of memory
asking: “How does history, in its literary writing, succeed in distinguishing
itself from fiction? To pose this question is to ask how history remains or
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rather becomes a representation of the past, something fiction is not, at least
in intention” (190). Ricoeur’s idea of truth asserts that “true” and “false” can
stand in for the terms “verifiable” and “refutable” (179), respectively—a helpful
view in looking at what truth is in creative nonfiction. Ricoeur goes on to posit
that representations of history are true if they show events and experiences “as
they really happened” (279). His ideas of truth are Aristotelian in this sense,
calling back to one of Aristotle’s famous phrases when defining “what truth
and falsehood are: for to say that that which is is not or that which is not is, is
a falsehood; and to say that that which is is and that which is not is not, is true”
(23). In creative nonfiction then, truth would become a matter of writing that
which is (or was) rather than that which is (or was) not.
Some creative nonfiction writers expand their narratives outside of what
is true by Ricoeur’s and Aristotle’s standards, creating characters, inventing
conversations, and combining events all for the sake of “moving the narrative
forward” (Gornick 9). Vivian Gornick admits to altering time in her memoir
Fierce Attachments, “ma[king] a composite out of the elements of two or more
incidents” and “play[ing] fast and loose with time” (9). Likewise, other authors
(such as Elie Wiesel) make the same moves in their work, moving further away
from a verifiable representation of history. Wiesel’s acclaimed memoir Night
involves the use of a composite character, which, for some, invalidates the
entire memoir. Other writers, however, believe that moves such as these create
a work of fiction rather than nonfiction. In his essay “Of Liars,” Montaigne
said, “In plain truth, lying is an accursed vice. We are not men, nor have other
tie upon one another, but by our word. If we did but discover the horror and
gravity of it, we should pursue it with fire and sword, and more justly than other
crimes.” Montaigne’s point of view has many followers, who believe that truth
is what makes humanity, and that forgoing truth in creative nonfiction in order
to sweeten the piece is an injustice to readers and other writers of the craft. This
debate regarding truth in nonfiction is an intricate conversation that has been
going on for years and has been limited in only designating two arguments:
first, that some fiction can exist and is inevitable in creative nonfiction, and
second, that nonfiction must only testify to the past as it actually existed.
This two-ended spectrum fails to recognize the intricacies of truth and how
it is achieved in recapturing memories. Viewing the discussion through this
dichotomy neglects a third approach where authors recognize the difficulties
memory holds when trying to create a completely accurate or true testimony,
yet still see merit in striving for that difficult truth and showing that war on the
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page. In grappling with the difficulties in this metacognitive way—the author
being self-consciously aware of his or her thought processes and memories and
the inadequacies inherent in both, and sharing them with the readers—these
authors can show readers and writers that “reality is sly, people are complicated,
and truth is slippery” (“Reality is Sly”). Presenting metacognition of memory
on the page shows readers that even through the difficulties of representation,
every sentence in our piece can still “aim for a truth that is a communication
between the reader and the writer” (“Reality is Sly”). Authors who engage in this
form of communication demonstrate to their readers the struggle of trying to
be truthful in their depiction, cueing their readers to parts of the memory that
might be less than whole. Some may think this visible metacognition muddies
the creative piece, but I argue that an open representation of memory will split
open the conversation regarding truth, creating a piece of creative nonfiction
that merits both parts of that title.
Creative nonfiction allows writers and readers to engage in a discovery of
the world around them—that which they see and experience in everyday life.
Readers come to the piece with an understanding that they will be reading a
true account, or rather, an account that does not deviate from what was and
existed in the experience being shared. Nancy Mairs defines what it means to
be truthful in creative nonfiction that emphasizes this relationship between
reader, writer, and the responsibility of truth even in its difficulty. She states:
When I write a piece labeled nonfiction, I make an implicit contract with
the reader, who reads with a set of expectations different from the ones fiction
elicits. . . . Perhaps I could have gotten away with some embellishment of the
facts and my own popularity would have soared, but I’d have strayed from my
aim of plumbing the significance of ordinary human experience. (Mairs 89)
Mairs points to the idea that truth is ordinary human experience. When a
writer consciously combines multiple people into one character, the character
no longer belongs to ordinary human experience; it becomes extraordinary. It
no longer exists as it was. It doesn’t represent reality but an unreal character.
Furthermore, when that author fails to alert the reader to the deviation, there
is a “disconnect” between the author and reader. Some writers of the creative
nonfiction genre may think that the expectation readers have is the very problem
of the debate—that readers anticipate too much from creative nonfiction, not
understanding that truth is difficult to grasp. If this is the case, then shouldn’t
we, as creative nonfiction writers, take it upon ourselves to inform the reader
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of the problematic nature of memory and truth in creative nonfiction through
demonstrating the memory wrestling that takes place?
Memory theorists as well as creative nonfiction writers recognize that it isn’t
possible to remember every minutia. Both groups, however, also understand
that it is still necessary to tell the story, to share the witness and testify to events
and experiences that exist in our past even if those events and experiences are
constantly moving away from us. In her award-winning memoir The Year of
Magical Thinking, Joan Didion demonstrates to us the importance of the act
of writing to understand, and at the most basic level, writing to remember.
Throughout the entire work, Didion is writing through the death of her husband,
remembering what that encompassing grief felt like, what grief means, and
what grief tells us about human nature and human experience. At the same
time, Didion’s memoir demonstrates how memory has shaped her experience.
Didion tells of an instance that demonstrates the fickle nature of memory as
well as the necessity of writing as a means of remembering when she recalls
her husband, who was also a writer, having a moment of creativity and finding
himself unprepared: “He had thought of something he wanted to remember
but when he looked in his pockets he found no cards. I need you to write
something down, he said” (23). She goes on to wonder about the forgetfulness
of her husband, questioning if it was an indication of his approaching death,
since she knows he had an understanding of memory and writing. She asks
herself, “Why had he forgotten to bring note cards to dinner that night? Had
he not warned me when I forgot my own notebook that the ability to make a
note when something came to mind was the difference between being able to
write and not being able to write?” (23). She wrote it down for him for the same
reason he asked her to: writing is to remember. Writing is a form of memory
preservation and dissemination. Even with the uncertainty of memory, Didion
recognizes the importance of communicating the past, sharing it, protecting it
from extinction in fading memory—the fate of memories not communicated
(Lowenthal 196). Didion writes, “This is my attempt to make sense of the period
that followed, weeks and then months that cut loose any fixed idea I had ever
had about death, about illness, . . . about life itself” (7). Didion understands
the importance of trying to contain this memory as much and as completely as
possible for her own understanding as well as for the understanding of others,
that it may “connect [her] with a meaningful cosmos” (Lowenthal 197). Even
though complete remembrance isn’t possible—for, as Lowenthal argues, “the
passage of time induces qualitative memory change as well as loss” (208)—what
50
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is possible is to be as truthful as we can about the reality of the event or
experience being shared, maintaining honesty regarding what is remembered
and what isn’t. It is necessary to have an open and honest conversation with
oneself as a writer and with the readers as they read the piece.
To facilitate this conversation of memory in a creative nonfiction
pziece, Giorgio Agamben’s ideas of subjectification and desubjectification
provide an apparatus with which creative nonfiction writers can understand
the questioning that needs to take place when testifying to personal and
collective memories. Agamben argues that testimony takes place once the
“I” is spoken. As soon as we identify ourselves as the subject of discourse, we
begin the process of subjectification and begin giving a testimony, even if, due
to our wavering memory, it is an inaccurate testimony. Subjectification, the
construction of the self and making the self a subject of exploration, is essential
for desubjectification to take place, and vice versa. Desubjectification is the act
of stepping outside of ourselves and the testimony we are giving, becoming an
onlooker of that self, and deconstructing that self to understand more fully
who we are and the experience we are unearthing. Put simply, subjectification
is the recognition of the self, and desubjectification is an attempt to analyze
oneself from an exterior position as an object rather than a subject. Agamben
recognizes that no one can put off their subjectivity but argues that in order
for discourse to take place, “the psychosomatic individual must fully abolish
himself and desubjectify himself as a real individual to become the subject of
enunciation” (116). In creative nonfiction, once the “I” is written the author is
engaged in testifying to something; whether the work is a journalistic piece or
a memoir, a testimony is being given of some person, event, or experience, and
desubjectification should be the goal.
In order for an author to write a memoir or personal essay, she must engage in
the text metacognitively and engage in the desubjectification of herself, stepping
back and seeing herself being seen by others, and asking herself questions that
will allow for fruitful analysis and further exploration of the event by the author
herself, her readers, and her critics. Agamben indicates that at the moment of
testimony there is a separation that occurs—the desubjectification where we
divide ourselves into two parts: what he calls the human and the nonhuman.
Many successful creative nonfiction writers engage in this dual conversation of
the two selves. In The Year of Magical Thinking, Joan Didion goes on an honest
exploration of her memory as she retells the account of her husband passing
away from cardiac arrest. She details to the reader the memories that stand clear
51
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in her mind and the events of the experience that have escaped her. Didion
questions herself throughout the piece, engaging in a mode of reflection that
is necessary for truth telling in creative nonfiction. In Agamben’s terms, the
human part of Didion in this process would be her detailing the experience of
losing her husband. The inhuman would be the part of her that existed in the
moment her husband was dying—the moment of the personal narrative that
has since past, which is currently being explored through writing. Didion is no
longer watching the EMTs try to resuscitate her husband, but she once was, so
there are two parts of her coexisting in this narrative that she needs to be aware
of: the part of her that is currently writing what she experienced, and the part
of her that experienced it. Didion recognizes these two parts, desubjectifying
herself when she recalls her retelling of the experience to her friends and states,
“Clearly I was not the ideal teller of this story, something about my version had
been at once too offhand and too elliptical” (6). This confession that Didion
makes, indicating she had honestly forgotten to tell her friends about the
blood her husband’s body left behind from hitting something as he fell down,
is a desubjectification of the self and an admission of a conversation Didion is
having with herself and her reader about the role of memory in telling her story.
Didion is stepping back, desubjectifying herself and trying to see herself
as others might view her, trying to see the holes in the witness she is giving.
Making this conversation of desubjectification visible to herself and her
readers allows Didion to further explore the event and her recollection of it, as
well as form a relationship of trust between her and her readers. The readers
recognize that Didion is keeping them in the loop, indicating where there is a
weakness in her memory, and showing them the wrestling she is taking part in
for the sake of relaying the event as closely as possible to how it really happened.
Other writers may have ignored this lapse in memory, devised a scene to fill
in the gap, and moved the story forward, simplifying the piece by not dealing
with the messiness of memory. However, Didion makes a conscious choice to
grapple metacognitively with her memory and bring reality, free from deviation,
to her creative nonfiction. It is clear that this admission of the messiness of
remembering and witnessing in creative nonfiction is much more interesting
than a clean, contrived retelling of an event. This metacognitive approach
allows the writer, reader, and critic more time for crucial pondering that could
bring to light interesting questions on the nature of memory and recollection—
questions such as why Didion forgot about the blood her husband’s body left
behind. This pondering could then lead to areas where further analysis could
52

winter 2014

take place: perhaps at the time Didion didn’t remember because she didn’t
realize the blood signified the horridness of it all to her, or maybe it was because
she knew exactly the weight of the recollection and her memory was protecting
her. If we have intrinsic systems in our bodies that protect ourselves from harm,
such as nerves telling us a flame is hot, then our mind or emotions must have
some aspect to protect us from the memories we are not prepared for or that
may hurt us. This inquiry of self-preservation is a result of the relationship
between the reader and writer that is created when the writer delineates the
interworking of her mind as she remembers. Moves such as these in creative
nonfiction writing not only open the conversation for analysis of memory, but
also produce a venue for the writer and reader to engage in further examination
of the piece and the experience being rendered, objectifying the narrative by
looking at it in ways that extend beyond itself. In this way, a piece of writing
such as Didion’s becomes so much more than a retelling of the events of a heart
attack; it becomes a search for meaning in the unexpected.
Just as Agamben’s subjectification and desubjectification theory forces the
author to acknowledge a duality in the memory process through the human and
inhuman aspect of the witness, Dominick LaCapra’s theory regarding working
through our pasts pushes us to engage in a similar dualism. LaCapra argues
that we must be both within and without to gain a greater understanding of the
event and learn from it. We must be able to revert to the moment of experience
and nearly relive it while also acknowledging that time has passed. Only then
can we use the dual perspective that naturally exists to look at the memory in
more helpful ways that will aid in understanding larger questions we may have
surrounding the experience.
LaCapra points out the impossibility of testifying to an event with
precision, for when expressing our testimony we are restricted to the modes
of representation we hold: language, art, and other forms of depiction. The
problem LaCapra sees in these representations is that they “may involve
distortion, disguise, and other permutations relating to processes of imagination
transformation and narrative shaping, as well as perhaps repression, denial,
dissociation, and foreclosure” (89). He goes on to argue, however, that even with
these weaknesses, “testimonies are significant in the attempt to understand
experience and its aftermath, including the role of memory and its lapses, in
coming to terms with—or denying and repressing—the past” (87). LaCapra’s
theory of being within and without when recalling our experiences can help us
avoid these problems of representation. If we look at our memories as we are
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testifying to them in our nonfiction pieces, if we ask ourselves questions such
as, “Is that how it really happened? Why do we remember certain things and
not others? Why is it important that we remember at all?” and as we grapple
with the complexities of those memories on the page, we can gain insight into
the event, into memory itself, and (as David Lowenthal would argue), into our
own identities (197–200). Additionally, if we allow ourselves to work through
these questions within the narrative itself, as Joan Didion does, we engage the
reader in the search for the answers, and our piece becomes honest and layered,
begging for analysis of the event, the witness, and the world that contains them.
LaCapra believes working through the trauma of past events begins when
“the past becomes accessible to recall in memory, and when language functions
to provide some measure of conscious control, critical distance, and perspective”
(90). Some creative nonfiction writers write in order to process the events in
their lives. These writers approach an essay with a question and work toward
understanding. Many who write personal essays with this purpose understand
the need for distance to avoid the “Therapist’s Couch,” where the writer is
still entirely consumed with conflicting emotions, or “Revenge Prose,” where
the writer’s intent seems to be pure vengeance, both of which Brenda Miller
discusses in Tell It Slant (44). Miller speaks to the same perspective for which
LaCapra argues. She indicates the necessity for a writer to gain distance and
emerge from the experience through time, wisdom, literature, and other forces
to gain perspective and to look at yourself and your experience from a different
point of view. She states, “This peripheral vision—this ability to sidle up to the
big issues by way of a side route—is the mark of an accomplished writer, one
who has gained enough perspective to use personal experience in the service of
a larger literary purpose” (45). Didion had to have enough distance in order to
write The Year of Magical Thinking with as much clarity, objectivity, and truth
to the human experience as she did. Didion tried writing the experience earlier,
but she could only get out four lines, as she hadn’t yet been able to remove
herself from the past enough to view it in the present (Didion 3). After waiting
some time before beginning again, Didion was able to give the past the space
it needed in order for her to understand the experience, how her memory had
changed it, and the larger context in which the experience existed. This distance
from the event is the “without” of LaCapra’s memory process. The “within”
aspect of the process is just as important in being able to work through our
memories. There must be the ability to return to the past and achieve closeness
to the event, even if that means acknowledging fear, sadness, or pain that our
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memories and past can sometimes contain. Didion had to be willing to go back
to the moment when her husband collapsed at the kitchen table; she put herself
in a position to relive a sorrowful event for the sake of working through the
trauma in writing. We must be here (the present) and there (the past) to gain
a greater understanding of the event (LaCapra 90), learn from it and represent
it as Ricoeur would say it truly was, without fiction, just as it occurred in the
past. Not only would our work be honest, but we would be working through our
past at the same time and engaging in “laying ghosts to rest, distancing oneself
from haunting revenants, renewing an interest in life, and being able to engage
memory in [a] more critically tested [sense]” (LaCapra 90), moving beyond a
crippling past to a state of understanding of the event being shared.
Through engaging the analysis of memory with readers in our creative
nonfiction pieces and inviting them into our incomplete memories through
metacognitive writing, we provoke readers to extend their understanding of the
world as they look at a subjective experience and as we try to make it objective. It
would then be impossible for our piece to reflect anything other than the reality
of ordinary human experience. Lee Gutkind writes that if creative nonfiction
means anything, it means “we are attempting, as writers, to show imagination,
to demonstrate artistic and intellectual inventiveness and still remain true to
the factual integrity of the piece we are writing” (3). Through doing this, we
are “reaching a deeper level of solidarity with those bearing a human form”
(Ricoeur 259). If we write our creative nonfiction pieces as reflections of the
ordinary human experience as it occurred, and if we lay bare the muddy waters
of memory that make such a representation so complex, we will transform
experience into understanding of that event and the greater world in which
that experience existed, providing insight for the reader, the writer, and even
the critic.
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